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ABSTRACT
The paper argues that there is a reductive logic inherent in concep-
tualisations of academic ability in some Western education research 
as currently configured. Effective interrogation of this concept neces-
sitates consideration across relevant fields of research, as outlined in 
three areas of critique: that research on educational stratification can 
adopt a contradictory stance with respect to conceptualising aca-
demic ability and defer to innate cognitive ability in pupil test data 
while denouncing this elsewhere; that cultural reproduction theory is 
itself a powerful social construction with ramifications for the possi-
bility of equal learning opportunities for all; and that a narrow focus 
on educational stratification reifies instrumental outcomes, devaluing 
some of the broader purposes of education. It is argued that these 
reductive tendencies have ramifications for education policy and 
school-based practices. A lack of focus on, and clarity about, the 
concept of academic ability warrants more holistic conceptualising, 
which draws on methodological pluralism.
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Introduction
The key interest of this paper is with education research on academic ability and its 
operationalisation in policy as well as for resulting school-based practices. It is argued 
that reductionist theorising (in terms of ontological reductionism) in bounded 
research fields (leading to epistemic and methodological reductionism) contributes 
to an impoverished conceptualisation of academic ability. Academic ability as a term 
is in wide use amongst school-based practitioners, as well as in education research, 
where it is also more specifically concerned with a number of different, but related, 
concepts. Kaplan and Saccuzzo (2017) state that, ‘[i]n view of the considerable over-
lap of achievement, aptitude, and intelligence tests, all three concepts are encom-
passed by the term human ability’ (2017, pp. 7–8), which is here configured to refer to 
the academic context, that is, academic ability encompassing academic achievement, 
aptitude and intelligence. Academic ability is used as a discrete concept in research 
concerned with understanding how a whole range of variables correlate with, or 
predict it (for instance Hansen, 2016; Malanchini, Engelhardt, Grotzinger, Harden, 
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& Tucker-Drob, 2019; York, Gibson, & Rankin, 2015) and is in regular use to define 
pupils deemed to be of high ability, or not. In this paper it is argued that effective 
interrogation into, and problematisation of, this concept, necessitates consideration 
across the research fields that pertain. The reductionist and contradictory findings 
that result warrant more holistic conceptualising, drawing on methodological plur-
alism, to better support school-based practice.
The arguments in this paper are underpinned by an ontological and epistemic 
divide that is posited in some Western education research in this area (by which is 
meant research in largely, but not exclusively, English-speaking journals, as refer-
enced in this paper). The divide is between education research focused on issues of 
social justice, disadvantage and inclusion, and education research focused on issues 
and concepts connected with intelligence, academic ability and gifted education 
(Author). This is certainly not clear cut or uncontested, and there is research which 
attempts to bridge these concerns (Mazzoli Smith, 2014). However, it is suggested 
that characterisation of these research fields as constituting a divide is useful, in order 
to bring to light issues about how academic ability is understood and operationalised. 
In the first case, research could be characterised as often situated in, or drawing on, 
the sociology of education, focused on social justice and education, utilising critical 
theory that foregrounds how structures and cultures of education reproduce disad-
vantage through the institutional privileging of the middle class. Bourdieu’s theory of 
cultural reproduction is seen as being predominant in this respect, shaping not only 
scholarly research, but also normative discourse and understandings for practitioners 
(Reay, 2004). Research with such aims is less likely to draw on individualistic con-
cepts such as intelligence, or concern itself with gifted education. Reference to 
academic ability is connected largely to the stratification of pupil attainment at 
group level. Influential work in such a demarcated field would be that of Reay 
(1998), Apple (2004) and Ball (2010), for instance. In the other case, which could 
be characterised as largely situated in, or drawing on, the psychology of education, 
differential and educational psychologists are concerned to research the concepts of 
intelligence and academic ability, utilising measures of cognitive ability that correlate 
with and predict academic attainment, creating and advancing the use of cognitive 
ability tests, for instance. Influential work in this area could be said to have been 
conducted by the Centre for Evaluation and Monitoring, for instance, which provides 
‘measures of an individual’s potential and progress though school’ (CEM, 2020).
The policy correlates of such paradigmatic polarisation can lead to challenging 
practical ramifications, as policies that exhort schools to ensure challenge for their 
most able pupils can pull against those that focus on narrowing the attainment gap 
between the most and least advantaged pupils, as high ability cohorts routinely tend to 
reproduce patterns of social segregation (Borland, 2005; Ofsted, 2015; Sapon-Shevin, 
1994). The tensions for schools practically, and philosophically, are clear. Indeed, there is 
a tension in the very idea of the sociology of intelligence, which for some rests on 
a position exemplified by Bourdieu: ‘I think one should purely and simply refuse to 
accept the problem of the biological or social foundations of “intelligence”, in which 
psychologists have allowed themselves to be trapped’ (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 178).
Whilst Bourdieu is right to invoke the metaphor of a trap to describe the resulting 
reductionism of psychological approaches to measures of individual intelligence, the 
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argument in this paper is that the sociology of education has itself not escaped the 
reductionist trap in relation to the concept of academic ability, deferring to the logic 
of biological reductionism that it rejects. Both dominant sociological and psycholo-
gical understandings of academic ability have hindered progress with respect to 
resulting conceptualisations for school-based practice, as contradiction and obfusca-
tion have led to reductive and biologically deterministic thinking. The focus of this 
paper is primarily on highlighting where there is the case by looking across these fields 
of inquiry and then how they have informed education policies and school practices. 
Here practice refers to activities such as psychometric testing, tracking and monitor-
ing systems, and the resulting planning and pedagogical interventions, implicating 
professionals at many levels, from senior managers to classroom teachers. Examples 
are given of English and US research, policy and school-based practices, but the 
implications of this argument are not exclusive to these countries, with Programme 
for International Student Assessment (PISA) data demonstrating wider impact. It is 
suggested that more focus on, and clarity about, the concept of academic ability, in 
conjunction with the key terms in use in this paper – intelligence, cognitive ability 
and potential – will result in pragmatic gains in terms of an operationalisation of the 
concept in schools that avoids such reductionism.
The argument in this paper draws on, and moves between, bodies of education 
research, variously drawing on psychological, sociological and policy-related fields. 
Only from such a meta-perspective is it possible to bring to light some of the tensions 
and contradictions inherent in how we operationalise these concepts (Mazzoli Smith, 
2014), here, particularly with respect to sociological approaches. At times, the argument 
will draw on one field of education research to bring to light a particular epistemological 
construction, and at other times will be situated at the centre of these, in order to look at 
the issues across different fields of research. Figure 1 demonstrates how these have been 
demarcated for the purposes of the argument in this paper. Notwithstanding the risk of 
generalising summaries in such an analysis where categories cannot be exhaustive, the 
argument highlights the epistemological contradictions that inform, and limit, the 
resulting policy and practice.
It is useful to posit some distinguishing features of the terms utilised in this paper that 
contribute to the conception of academic ability being discussed, again notwithstanding 
Figure 1. Fields of education research informing conceptualisations and practices around academic 
ability.
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the problem of lack of consensus around definitions. Here intelligence refers to a global, 
individual human function, which draws on both diverse theories and a particular history 
of measurement (Mackintosh, 2011). The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children 
(WISC) is referred to specifically as a measure of intelligence (Kaufman, Raiford, & 
Coalson, 2016), although elsewhere it is also referred to as a measure of general cognitive 
ability (Gomez, Vance, & Watson, 2016). Cognitive ability is defined by its measurement 
in cognitive ability testing, the most widespread test of reasoning ability in UK schools 
(Deary, Strand, Smith, & Fernandes, 2007). The manual of the second edition of the 
‘British Ability Scales’ (BAS) (Elliot, Smith, & McCulloch, 1996) claims explicitly that it is 
a measure of cognitive ability and not intelligence. Academic, or educational attainment, 
is used to refer to the highest level of education an individual has successfully completed 
(Schneider, 2011), whereas academic achievement tends towards a broader understand-
ing of success at school, notwithstanding the fact that often it is reduced to a narrow 
measure of examination attainment (Smith, 2003). (Academic) potential is the most 
problematic of these terms, and indeed the argument here will foreground this. However, 
it is in widespread usage in schools as a concept used to refer to future, but as yet 
unrealised, academic achievement, or attainment, of pupils. Discursive reference to 
pupils fulfilling their potential is arguably ubiquitous in education, seen, for instance in 
England, in both education policy documents (e.g. Department for Education, 2017) and 
widely on school websites and policy documents.
The argument here proceeds by demarcating three areas of critique of dominant social 
justice/sociological approaches to educational stratification. The characterisation of such 
approaches is broad-brush, and as a result there is only scope for several illustrative 
examples. However, the suggestion of a recognisable approach to the issue of stratified 
educational outcomes is familiar, with Gorard, for instance, referring to the acceptance 
that educational stratification is worsening as ‘the crisis approach to stratification 
research’ (2010, p. 50). It will be demonstrated how such approaches defer to an innate, 
individual measure of cognitive ability, or intelligence, in drawing on pupil outcome data, 
whilst disavowing the epistemological implications of such data elsewhere. The ramifica-
tions of such constructivist framing for schools, with a lack of clarity about the concept of 
academic ability, and by extension potential, alongside an undue focus on the instru-
mental aspects of education, are damaging. The paper concludes by highlighting the 
affordances of methodological pluralism in this area, as well as existing progressive 
models of academic ability that could be more widely utilised to mitigate these reductive 
and deterministic tensions.
Reductionism in research on educational stratification and the link to 
conceptualisations of academic ability
Contradictions in perspectives on academic ability in sociological analyses of educa-
tional stratification
The first critique in this paper, drawing on Nash (1999, 2001), concerns a fundamental 
contradiction at the heart of dominant sociological approaches to educational stratifica-
tion, leading to problems in defining academic ability and associated concepts such as 
potential. The contradiction rests on the fact that such approaches defer to biological 
reductionism with respect to cognitive ability as innate and measurable in the use of test- 
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based pupil outcome data, but then elsewhere denounce the use of such measures of 
ability:
When as sociologists we find it expedient to use the concept of ‘ability’ in our explanatory 
accounts and ‘ability’ tests in our research, we would be wise to acknowledge the theoretical 
ontogeny of the concept and to challenge, rather than contribute to, its ambiguities and 
contradictions. (Nash, 2001, p. 201)
Nash’s (1999, 2001) critique is particularly linked to cultural reproduction theory, which 
is discussed further later in this article. However, the critique applies more broadly to 
analyses of educational outcomes utilising datasets including tests based on measures of 
cognitive ability and/or intelligence, as part of multivariate analyses, for instance, where 
there is also an over-arching social constructivist framing such that the existence of 
cognitive ability/intelligence as measured in such tests is found to be problematic. As 
Nash notes: ‘It seems to be acceptable to use tests of “ability” and evidence generated by 
them when it is convenient to do so’ (2001, p. 200).
This contradiction arises in part because cognitive ability/intelligence as a testable 
construct is a good predictor of school success and tests based on such a concept have 
predictive validity. This is unsurprising as they were designed to be so:
Scores from IQ-type tests often account for some 40% of the variance of in academic 
attainment, by far the largest proportion that can be allocated. This is why IQ theory is so 
powerful: it appears to explain the largest proportion of the variance in academic attain-
ment. (Nash, 2001, p. 190)
These data are therefore not only descriptive with respect to social stratification, but also 
predictive of it, and as such evidence the extent of the stratification by educational 
attainment that research with a social justice aim seeks to highlight. The pertinent 
epistemic question is what exactly is (and is not) being measured and it is the interroga-
tion of this that should be more prominent. Whilst many sociologists of education, for 
instance, would agree that what is being measured is indeed the critical question, the use 
of pupil datasets is still often adopted unproblematically in research discussing educa-
tional outcomes. Data that includes measures of cognitive ability are often used to predict 
educational progression, or the yet more ambiguous concept of potential, on which 
arguments about just outcomes are made.
A case in point is the many studies that argue how high-attaining, socio-economically 
disadvantaged children are academically overtaken by their less highly attaining but more 
socio-economically advantaged peers (e.g. Goodman & Gregg, 2010), exemplifying the 
crisis approach to stratification. Indeed, this particular line of argument has taken hold of 
public imagination and driven education policy across different political parties, despite 
notable methodological issues, such as regression to the mean (Jerrim & Vignoles, 2011). 
The argument in this paper looks primarily at the ontological and epistemic issues, as 
conflicting paradigmatic framings of ability influence school policies, as illustrated in 
Figure 1, leading to obscurity in practice. Morris, Dorling, and Davey Smith’s (2016) 
research, seeking to determine the extent of socio-economic disparities while accounting 
for ability, is considered as an example of this. The paper demonstrates the correlation 
between ability at age eight, measured by the WISC intelligence scale, and GCSE and 
A-level results, at group level. The WISC measure is designed to be predictive of 
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scholastic ability as measured in attainment tests. The importance of cognitive ability as 
a predictor of later expected levels of achievement underpins the findings and conclusion 
of the paper:
It therefore appears that the education system within the UK is failing socio-economically 
disadvantaged children by not allowing them to even reach their expected educational level 
based upon their early childhood achievements. (Morris et al., 2016, p. 2)
In their paper the authors therefore endorse age eight as an appropriate point at which to 
take a measurement of cognitive ability that can be used to predict expected levels of 
achievement in the future. The arbitrary nature of the testing paradigm, much critiqued 
in the sociology of education more broadly, is brought to light here. This early measure of 
cognitive ability is taken as an important indicator of potential, and we expect to see 
achievement borne out in a predictable way, based, therefore, on an essentialist belief 
about individual levels of cognitive ability. For a child who fails to achieve their potential, 
being overtaken by a less bright, but wealthier child for instance, there is indignation. 
A child’s early levels of cognitive ability appear, implicitly, to be conceived of as justly 
predictive of later outcomes and hence somehow more ‘natural’ with respect to social 
justice assessments than outcomes driven by socio-cultural factors.
Morris et al.’s work states that academic attainment is known to be influenced by 
genetic and biological factors, claiming that their ‘use of the thoroughly administered 
WISC test provided a robust indicator of a combination of inherent cognitive ability and 
already learnt behaviour by age eight combined’ (Morris et al., 2016, p. 12). Yet by the 
logic of this argument, why is it not already unfair to predict optimal future outcomes at 
age eight if this has been in part shaped by learnt behaviour? Are we not on shaky ground 
to assert any age as the appropriate one upon which to assess fair outcomes? Even if 
innate/bio-genetic and socio-cultural factors were separable in any meaningful way, there 
is an assumption that cognitive advantages derived from social advantages are less 
deserved than cognitive advantages derived from biological/natural ones. The concern 
here is not with the social justice claims per se, but the fact that the logic of such 
approaches must defer to a biologically deterministic model of ability. The trap then is 
that in affording such weight to cognitive ability measures and linear models of progres-
sion in assessing educational potential and outcomes, the authors are de facto endorsing 
the validity and appropriateness of the test-based measures elsewhere derided as arbitrary 
and reductive.
One of the paper’s authors, Dorling, for instance, states elsewhere that ‘[w]ithin rich 
countries, the portrayal of children’s abilities as lying along bell curves (as these are 
natural things) is unjust’ (2010a, p. 9) and that ‘m]ass testing of children is a symptom of 
affluence’ (2010a, p. 77). About IQ tests Dorling writes: ‘The tests measure how well 
children have been taught to pass them . . . . Intelligence tests have nothing to do with 
anything innate’ (2010b, p. 40). Yet the data on which Morris, Dorling and Davey Smith 
critique the lack of progress of disadvantaged children in society is on the basis of tests of 
innate, individual levels of measurable cognitive ability. Dorling also states that ‘[a]ll 
children have ability, not potential, capacity or capability . . . [and the] coming battle 
worldwide will focus on the right to be seen as equally able’ (2010a, p. 89), and this 
critique of the limits placed on any child with respect to how much it is assumed they can 
learn is powerful and appropriate. However, this is a largely polemical use of the concepts 
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of ability and potential that contradicts the way these specific constructs are utilised in 
studies that draw on empirical data, such as that by Morris et al.
There is widespread deferment to constructivist framings of academic ability as being 
appropriate when social justice concerns are under discussion, but which also draw on 
empirical pupil data in this way, and this example is in no way unusual or intended to 
single out these authors in particular. Indeed, the point of this paper is that influenced in 
large part by the seminal Bourdieusian idea of ‘misrecognition’, whereby something 
socially formed can be reinterpreted as something natural (James, 2015), approaches to 
educational stratification fall into this contradictory space of both looking to such 
empirical data to evidence stratification, whilst also disavowing the nature of what it is 
the data measures. Ball exemplifies the stance often adopted in stating: ‘Resource 
differences and collective efforts and investments made or not within families become 
translated into individual “ability” differences or indicators of different sorts of “abilities”’ 
(Ball, 2010, p. 162). Yet in concurrently drawing on pupil outcome data to assess social 
justice questions, such approaches could be contributing to the very forms of misrecog-
nition they critique. This claim is explored further by considering the dominant theore-
tical framing.
Constraints and limitations of cultural reproduction theory
The second critique focuses on widespread use of a dominant theoretical and meth-
odological approach with respect to questions of educational reproduction and stratifica-
tion in the Western sociology of education, that is, cultural reproduction theory 
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). Bourdieu sees the social order as having an overall systemic 
pattern that gives definition to its parts, such that social distinctions obtain the quality of 
an objective structure and become definitive for individuals (Hall, 1992). There have been 
many critiques of Bourdieu as pessimistic, deterministic, reductionist and/or fatalistic 
(e.g. Alexander, 1995; Goldthorpe, 2007; Sayer, 1999; Willis, 1983) and I refer to and 
draw on those that have particular salience for debates about academic ability. There is 
not the scope here to explore Bourdieu’s refutation of the determinist tag and this is not 
necessarily pertinent to the argument, as what is explored here is normative usage of 
cultural reproduction such that it is widely understood to theorise the educational 
trajectories of pupils from different backgrounds and explain how education systems 
reinforce these trajectories.
One of the key critiques of Bourdieu is that he fails to engage with the subjective 
experience of objective possibilities among learners who buck the trend for social class 
reproduction (e.g. West, Fleming, & Finnegan, 2013), or, as Sayer describes it, ‘actors’ 
own normative judgements in explaining what they do’ (1999, p. 410). The disadvantaged 
are condemned to repeat the conditions of their existence (Crompton, 2006). Crompton 
suggests that Bourdieu’s arguments could be considered descriptive and tautological, 
with an inherent circularity, where practices generate the same further practices and it is 
difficult to then identify sources of change. Crompton notes the importance of recognis-
ing this, given that the family context is the locus:
Indeed, this circularity is inevitable given that the reproduction of both economic and 
cultural capitals takes place over the life cycle of the family. Thus accounts of this reproduc-
tion are bound to be descriptive . . . . Most families will continue to do their very best to 
assure the position of their children within the limits of the resources they have available . . . . 
(2006, pp. 671–672)
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Linked to this is the critique that Bourdieu’s view of cultural capital is seen by some as too 
constrained (West et al., 2013), neglecting the psychosocial, for instance. If we consider 
the evidence from widening participation studies and lifelong learning, this certainly 
appears to be correct, in that narrative research highlights the complex psychosocial 
schema necessary to interpret more fully individual lived experiences of progression in 
education (Formenti & West, 2014). West et al. argue that to have a fuller understanding 
of capital, we need ‘more fine-grained, psychosocial analysis of how inner worlds may 
shape outer worlds’ (West et al. 2013, p. 123). This is curtailed because of Bourdieu’s 
focus on the ‘socialized body’ (James, 2015), in what Goldthorpe refers to as an ‘over- 
socialized’ view of the individual (2007, p. 8). Sayer describes Bourdieu’s view of action as 
lying ‘between the extremes of external determination and rational choice, having an 
unexamined, bodily, practical character, scarcely mediated let alone directed by reason’ 
(1999, p. 405). The result of applying this theorising in practical terms, to follow 
Bourdieu’s edict, is to find that the concept of cultural capital is partial, unable to account 
for what matters to people in a holistic sense, leading, itself, to misrecognition.
Lamont and Lareau (1988), have argued that the grounds of distinction are too 
diverse to be understood in one totalising, reductive, zero-sum model. Silva and Smart 
(1999) refer to more than one normative guideline to provide the context for people’s 
different locations and we fail to take account of lived experiences if we disallow 
diverse, and arguably ever-increasing, routes for distinction, as technology democra-
tises sites in which distinction can be obtained, for instance. An on-going critique, 
therefore, is that the framework of class does not subsume all else within it and that 
distinctions are evaluatively and meaningfully based on other categories such as 
ethnicity, gender, religion and a host of lifestyle identities that do not fall into clear 
groupings.
If we accept this critique of cultural capital as partial, able to obscure the diversity of 
factors that can contribute to the structuring of the learner in school, this then links to the 
suggestion that implicit understandings of academic ability are problematic. Dunne and 
Gazeley note that ‘[t]here is little conceptual clarity about the relative terms “ability” and 
“underachievement”’ (2008, p. 453) and comment on the uncritical use of prior attain-
ment data as encouraging teachers to underestimate the educational potential of work-
ing-class pupils. Dunne and Gazeley found that where teachers were likely to locate 
working-class students’ underachievement in areas beyond their sphere of influence, the 
underachievement of middle-class pupils was thought about in terms of what could be 
done in the classroom to address it. Such teacher beliefs have also been found in research 
related to Poverty Proofing the School Day in England (Mazzoli Smith & Todd, 2019). 
This stance accords rationally with the logic of cultural capital as developed largely in the 
home and its potential misalignment with normative school culture. If the normative 
usage of cultural capital accepts it as largely the preserve of the middle classes, and tends 
towards a conceptualisation that is holistic and causally deterministic, rather than the 
partial, it is rational for teachers to impute a limit in terms of what they can do to improve 
the achievement track of disadvantaged pupils. This will be particularly acute in an 
educational climate that affords great weight to the predictive potential of outcome 
data, which also reinforce the theory of cultural reproduction, as discussed earlier.
Work on the nature of self-fulfilling prophecies in education suggests that negative 
ones are more powerful than positive ones and that they are more powerful among more 
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disadvantaged students (Jussim, Eccles, & Madon, 1996). Hattie (2008) endorses the 
impact of self-fulfilling prophecies in connection with demotivation and discusses evi-
dence that shows teachers are likely to have their students meet their expected outcomes:
Based on this evidence, teachers must stop over-emphasizing ability, and start emphasizing 
progress (steep learning curves are the right of all students regardless of where they start), 
stop seeking evidence to confirm prior expectations but seek evidence to surprise them-
selves, find ways to raise the achievement of all, stop creating schools that attempt to lock in 
prior achievement and experiences, and be evidence-informed about the talents and growth 
of all students. (2008, p. 124)
Hattie’s reference to ability here underscores the reductive trap being highlighted in this 
paper. The largely socially determined and culturally constructed nature of underachie-
vement, when seen in the light of the dominant theory of cultural reproduction, appears 
to be working as a barrier as real in its impacts as belief in innate ability, because of the 
implicit link between the two. If pupils’ perceived lack of cultural capital influences 
teacher efficacy, then this is telling of a determinism that lessens the likelihood of equal 
educational opportunities being made available in schools in practice. It is likely that an 
implicit link exists for teachers between the concept of cultural capital, construed as 
largely socially situated and structurally transmitted, and academic ability, construed as 
largely innate and individual, linked to teacher efficacy. This has been explored by Nash 
(2005), drawing on Bernstein, but the argument could also draw upon Bourdieu’s own 
caution about the power of socially constructed academic categories. Despite Bourdieu’s 
directive to ‘put into practice’ his concepts (Reay, 2004, p. 440), we see how they have 
a powerfully descriptive role in educational discourse, and are utilised as over-arching 
theory, shaping – and arguably delimiting – school-based practices as a result (Mazzoli 
Smith & Todd, 2019).
James (2015), in a sympathetic critique of Bourdieu, suggests that Bourdieu’s com-
pass – or scale – of analysis is such that it is hardly likely to deliver recipes for action. 
However, he does argue that this does not prevent change for the better. Yet, on the 
contrary, it can be argued that the widespread usage of a reductive model of cultural 
capital as only a partial vehicle for understanding is contributing to the prevention of 
change away from a legacy of biological determinism about academic ability (White, 
2006). A shift away from this dominant and obfuscating discourse is needed, such that 
progressive, holistic understandings of academic ability can come to the fore, drawing on 
a wider and more comprehensive understanding about fostering academic ability, in 
order to better support the teaching and learning of all pupils.
Instrumentalism and the focus on educational outcomes
A third critique focuses on an instrumental conception of education as outcomes- 
oriented and zero-sum that dominates many social justice analyses of educational 
stratification. The concern is about reductionism again, in that analyses largely fail to 
account for the value of education as in any way intrinsically worthwhile, or meaningful, 
other than through the acquisition of credentials. Cultural reproduction theory draws on 
an economic logic that is applied to a host of spheres of life, including education, in that 
capitals all, ultimately, have an exchange value. As Bourdieu writes, ‘economic capital is 
at the root of all the other types of capital’ (Bourdieu, 1997, p. 54) and ‘[cultural capital] is 
appropriated by agents and implemented and invested as a weapon and a stake in the 
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struggles which go on in the fields of cultural production’ (Bourdieu, 1997, p. 50). Sayer 
refers to Bourdieu’s economic view of culture in characterising the dynamics of the social 
field ‘as an amoral economy’ (1999, p. 407) wherein action is ‘instrumental, egotistical, 
and amoral’ (1999, p. 409). Sayer argues that it is important to distinguish between use- 
value and exchange-value and the contingent relation between the two, yet this is over-
looked in an ostensibly instrumental perspective. Sayer notes Bourdieu’s zeal for ‘instru-
mental action’ and the denial of things that can be valued for their own sake (1999, 
p. 407). So, whilst educational capital has an exchange-value and is a positional good that 
can become devalued as more people acquire it, this does not affect use-value (Sayer, 
1999), which is not devalued if we consider the learning of the individual, or group, in 
and for itself. Yet the importance of PISA data, for instance, demonstrates the increasing 
demand for international outcomes-based, standardised testing for the purposes of 
comparability. These outcome metrics then become a proxy for the learning process in 
context, when, in fact, the cross-sectional methodology underlying such standardised 
testing ignores the longitudinal nature of learning understood in differing contexts. 
About PISA data Goldstein says:
Perhaps the major [critique] centres around the narrowness of its focus, which remains 
concerned, even fixated, with the psychometric properties of a restricted class of concep-
tually simplistic models. There is almost no reference to debates about the appropriateness 
of these models, nor is there reference to methodological and substantive critiques. 
(Goldstein, 2004)
Analysing the benefits of education as being wholly connected to attainment, and then 
further progression in labour market terms, is driven by a human capital model of 
education as developed from the University of Chicago economics of the 1960s. Yet as 
Robeyns states: ‘Human capital theory cannot explain the behaviour of someone who 
wants to spend her time studying something without any prospect of economic returns 
from this education’ (2006, p. 72). The corollary of this in terms of cultural reproduc-
tion theory is that we disregard, or fail to see, intrinsic interests with no instrumental 
value, or if we do notice these, we only see them as a function of the dominant culture, 
which in educational terms seems unacceptably narrow. The link here with conceptua-
lisations of academic ability is that currently, tests of cognitive ability are largely 
developed to be predictive of academic attainment as measured in further tests. 
Reinforcing an interest in this instrumental conception of educational outcomes and 
worth, by focusing too exclusively on outcome measures and taking these as a proxy for 
educational value in a more general sense, is reductionist with respect to a broader 
understanding of the purpose, or meaning, of education. Even within the logic of the 
instrumental focus, when children are facing such a fast-changing and likely unim-
aginable future world of work, a more progressive conceptualisation of academic ability 
is timely. In the context of an unpredictable future, the extant model of narrow 
measures of cognitive ability, predictive of an already conceived set of attainment 
outcomes, seems limited even by the logic of this instrumental reading of the purpose 
of education.
A metrics-led, instrumental approach to education is often critiqued as the product 
of a neo-liberal and unduly individualist ideology (e.g. Apple, 2004; Biesta, 2015) and 
yet it appears to be solely these outcomes that are taken as adequate grounds on which 
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to assess educational value in research on stratification. This leads to the unwelcome 
metaphor of education characterised as a race. As Roberts writes: ‘Boosting working 
class children’s performances will not lead to increased upward mobility if the middle 
classes maintain their lead’ (Roberts, 2009). Such arguments fall prey to the reductive 
trap, leading inevitably to the conclusion that ‘equalising attainment will depend on 
capping middle-class progress’ (Roberts, 2009). Arriving at a place where capping any 
child’s progress can be legitimately called for is to be totally in thrall to an instrumental 
model of metrics-led education to the exclusion of all else. Such a statement, made in 
another context where the purpose of education is more broadly configured, would be 
baulked at on ethical grounds and would arguably be considered anti-educational and 
unjust.
Whilst a focus on the instrumental outcomes of education does matter, it must 
surely be balanced with an understanding of broader educational values and purpose, 
and an awareness that metrics-based outcomes and accreditation are neither wholly 
deterministic of lives thereafter, nor adequately represent the purpose of education. 
Without this broader focus in social justice approaches to education, we promote de 
facto instrumental outcomes as those that matter. Here the reductive trap means that 
attainment data are reified and seen as a proxy for educational value in toto. Brown 
highlights what is lost when this happens, whilst also firmly endorsing the importance 
of a class-based analysis of educational outcomes as part of a sociological approach to 
education:
A wider conception of social justice in the study of education and social mobility should also 
include quality-of-life issues . . . . This wider research agenda would help overcome educa-
tion being treated as a ‘black box’ in a lot of the social mobility literature, with an almost 
exclusive focus on class differences in education attainment. Issues of curriculum, pedagogy 
and student experiences are largely absent because the education system is treated as 
a monolithic sorting machine within which class inequalities shape the opportunities and 
rational responses of students. (Brown, 2013, p. 691)
There are areas of education research where a trend away from this focus on educational 
progress, achievement and/or attainment can be seen. For instance, the field of 
Educational Effectiveness Research (EER) has begun to diversify the range of educational 
outcomes considered. As Reynolds et al. write, ‘these include non-cognitive outcomes 
such as student well-being’, although ‘student achievement is still the predominant 
effectiveness criterion in EER’ (Reynolds et al., 2014, p. 205). The adoption of greater 
methodological pluralism in this field is also to be noted, as is the dynamic theory of 
educational effectiveness (Creemers & Kyriakides, 2008), which is comprehensive in 
nature, looking across different levels in an education system and foregrounding the 
study of change. However, the What Works Clearinghouse methodology remains positi-
vist, permissible research utilising experimental and quasi-experimental design to mea-
sure educational outcomes domains, described as ‘a group of closely related outcome 
measures, believed to provide information on the same underlying skill or ability’ 
(WWC, 2020).
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Critical thinking and conceptualisations of academic ability
A particular example of how the reductive logic of the approaches highlighted thus far 
may undermine a broad understanding of educational purpose is with respect to critical 
thinking. Nash (1999) claims that intelligence and cognitive ability testing are at least in 
some respects testing the higher-order thinking skills that we esteem across all levels of 
education. A hierarchical language of cognitive skills and abilities is ubiquitous in 
education when construed as critical thinking, but downplayed or ignored when the 
focus is on outcomes as understood through class analysis. In response to Bourdieu’s 
argument that the cognitive skills favoured by schools should be recognised as an artefact 
of the class-cultural system, a form of symbolic violence, with no legitimate claim to 
superiority, Nash (1999) states that certain cognitive skills are necessary for the effective 
mastery of any form of pedagogy and that this is culturally irrelevant. Here again, 
resistance in the sociology of education to focusing on academic ability as a legitimate 
concept in education – including the skill, or ability, to think critically – potentially 
undermines research on and the teaching of these concepts.
If we see higher-order, or critical, thinking as more than a cognitive skill and rather 
part of a wider disposition of ‘critical being’, drawing on affective aspects (Biggs, 2011), 
the argument about the reductive trap still holds. Mezirow, the seminal figure in the field 
of transformative learning, espouses as central to his work the metacognitive application 
of critical thinking, which is explicated well by West et al. (2013):
Critical thinking transforms an acquired frame of reference with potentially radical con-
sequences. Critical rationality involves an old mindset being replaced by a different world 
view. While any mindset consists of values, beliefs and feeling as well as concepts, transfor-
mation has to do with changing epistemic assumptions. . . . It is persons in relationship that 
lie at the heart of epistemic shifts. (West et al., 2013, p. 121)
These relational and dynamic aspects of critical thinking, drawing not only on cognitive, 
but also conative and affective dimensions of learning, extend beyond concerns with the 
cognitive measures discussed earlier. They necessitate an expanded and holistic, rather 
than a retracted and reductive, framing of the educational endeavour (and by implication 
the concept of academic ability). Understanding bodies of knowledge as meaningful only 
in terms of discourse and power is also reductive, however, and leads to the devaluing of 
what should arguably be most at stake in terms of educational purpose: a certain critical 
disposition whereby one is able to avail oneself of knowledge and skills in order to think 
reflectively and critically about one’s place in, and perspective on, the world. Giroux 
acknowledges this, in referencing Willis’ classic study of working-class boys, Learning to 
Labour:
Willis’s lads rejected the primacy of mental labor and its ethos of individual appropriation, 
but in doing so they closed off any possibility of pursuing an emancipatory relationship 
between knowledge and dissent. By rejecting intellectual labor, the lads discounted the 
power of critical thinking as a tool of social transformation. (1983, p. 284)
Yet a predominant theory of cultural reproduction places students in a double bind, 
whereby they must largely, as a group, fail to recognise the limits of their own resistance. 
Giroux (1983) notes this as an irony, in that a theory of cultural reproduction with 
deterministic ramifications denies students the necessary agency to creatively and 
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actively resist the reproduction of their class consciousness. At a foundational level, there 
is a disavowal of critical reason in Bourdieusian social theory, with ‘nothing in lay 
practice for normative argument to work on, no existing critical impulses to develop’, 
since all action is subsumed to the instrumental logic of power and interest (Sayer, 1999, 
p. 417). In utilising Bourdieu, activity around supporting children’s learning is subsumed 
into the workings of power alone. Statements such as ‘[a] Bourdieusian analysis reveals 
the intricate dynamics of power which infuse all aspects of parental involvement’ (Reay, 
1998, p. 71) are to be expected in the absence of any counterfactual, and through a lens 
whereby educational value is seen in instrumental terms. There is no possibility of finding 
out what parents might do in relation to supporting their children’s education in a society 
where all outcomes are equalised and there could be no material or symbolic benefit in 
doing so.
Whilst Sayer notes that Bourdieu wishes for actors to become critically self-reflexive, 
he claims that there is no indication of what this might involve and nothing to furnish the 
presupposition entailed about the potential to think critically, ‘a possibility which 
Bourdieu is reluctant to concede in explaining existing practice’ (1999, p. 418). 
Arguably pedagogy per se, construed as radical or not, class-bound or not, should have 
critical thinking and self-awareness as a central educational aim, yet it is argued that 
pedagogy as a field is itself underdeveloped (Young & Muller, 2013). The reductive logic 
under discussion here could be found to devalue the importance of critical thinking as 
a component of academic ability through which change is fostered.
Methodological pluralism in approaches to educational stratification
If dominant sociological, and theoretical, approaches to educational questions are taking 
us into a reductive trap that is possibly undermining important aspects of the educational 
endeavour, then methodological pluralism may be one way of mitigating this. Where 
metrics-based outcome measures tend not to offer explanations ‘of individuals in any real 
sense, but of groups understood as being composed of identical individuals’ (Nash, 2002, 
p. 407), then such understandings should be treated as partial and limited. Nash (2002) 
states that the assumption of individuals within the group as identical, for the purposes of 
statistical models that drive known facts about attainment, is at odds with realist 
common sense, as what individuals actually do is often unknown and therefore unex-
plained. The identification of all relevant variables that contribute to attainment is 
impossible to achieve and what we ‘know’ at group level does not mirror what we 
might observe at individual level and we have a lesser social explanation as a result. 
Without any deep knowledge of the social processes by which group patterns are 
generated, binaries such as innate or socially constructed conceptualisations of ability 
pertain, leading to the situation whereby whichever side of the fence we are on, we are 
caught in the same reductive logic. The absence of the affective and relational, in 
particular, is of great concern in such methodological reductionism:
[M]uch of educational theory and sociological research gives little or no attention to the 
affective aspects of the learning environment. Students are generally represented in socio-
logical research as if they were simply rational actors, purely cognitive beings learning 
‘subjects’ in schools . . . (Lynch, 2001, p. 251)
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This calls for an educational approach to research on academic ability and allied concepts 
that draws more self-reflexively and critically on diverse bodies of disciplinary knowl-
edge, through a ‘positive pluralism’ (Crompton, 2006, p. 658). Sayer states that: ‘We have 
to go beyond sociology as conventionally defined in order to understand its subjects’ 
(1999, p. 426). Yet in-depth qualitative studies of individuals or cases are not easily linked 
to system-level patterns of outcomes and Nash (2002) notes the problems of models 
where different level variables have the same nominal scale and an undefined relationship 
to each other.
Rarely, in addition, is it considered in this kind of stratification research that whilst 
middle class, advantaged children may indeed be attaining more highly, their quality of 
learning may still be impoverished and may not represent where we would wish educa-
tion to be. There is a concern about the growing instrumentalism of university students 
with respect to their learning (Woodall, Hiller, & Resnick, 2014), and high levels of 
attainment do not necessarily equate with enjoyment at school (Power, Whitty, Edwards, 
& Wigfall, 1998). Quality of learning and well-being cannot be taken for granted, even for 
high attainers, if they have come through an instrumentally driven system, let alone for 
lower attainers who will suffer the added shame of falling behind in the race. Yet we 
continue to foreground attainment outcomes in the sociology of education as a proxy for 
the quality and purpose of education overall, conflating use-value with exchange-value in 
Sayer’s distinction (1999). Considering educational quality more holistically repositions 
the focus away from measurable levels of potential, ability and attainment, towards 
optimal learning contexts.
Concluding comments: the importance of holistic theorising and pluralist 
methodologies for progressive conceptualisations of academic ability
Understandings of academic ability seem to be in many ways stubbornly linked to 
historic understandings (White, 2006), as well as disciplinary interests (Mazzoli Smith, 
2014). The framework of measurable attainment outcomes, standardised age-related 
development and innate conceptualisations of cognitive ability that are operationalised 
in school-based practice are not only deeply contested from a range of differing dis-
ciplinary perspectives, but arguably also fail to deliver with respect to the challenges of 
the changing world. Areas within even the field of gifted education are ‘moving increas-
ingly towards recognizing the fluid and multifaceted qualities of high potential and its 
contextual, dynamic, and emergent nature’ (Dai, 2013, p. 99) and this may therefore be 
a beneficial, if unlikely, place for the sociology of education to turn.
In the field of research still anachronistically referred to as gifted education, research 
on academic ability is increasingly concerned with evaluative questions about the pur-
pose of education, drawing on methodological pluralism in order to counter a troubled 
past and the stratified nature of cohorts of gifted pupils. The progressive end of the field 
tends towards a broad, holistic conceptualisation of academic ability (and intelligence) as 
a fluid capacity or disposition in context (Sternberg, 2004), in direct contradistinction to 
a fixed, ontologically reductive understanding still implicated in instrumentally con-
ceived approaches in sociological research, as described earlier. Some conceptualisations 
move beyond such bounded constructs altogether, to talk of a paradigm shift from 
a categorical model of identification of the few, where concepts such as ‘giftedness’ and 
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‘potential’ are largely opaque, to a focus on developmental diversity and the contextual 
nature of learning (Borland, 2005; Matthews & Dai, 2014; Matthews & Foster, 2005).
Current research findings show enormous differences in the way that children develop, 
including in their timing and growth patterns, their areas of interest, their motivation, and 
their capacity to respond to different kinds of learning challenges. Educators are realizing 
that the old way of identifying, labelling and segregating children by virtue of their general 
intelligence or academic ability test scores at one point in time, is harder and harder to 
defend. (Matthews & Foster, 2008, p. 3)
Here, there is a focus on the significance of the future in the present for learning, but not 
in an instrumental way: ‘Everything we see in children is transitional, promises and signs 
of the future . . . not to be treated as achievements, cut off and fixed; they are prophetic, 
signs of an accumulating power and interest’ (Dewey, 1902, p. 14, quoted in Hymer, 2009, 
p. 301). Foregrounding the relational and contextual in conceptualising academic ability 
will help to mitigate the reductive trap discussed earlier. ‘when one expands their unit of 
analysis to consider person-in-situation, much of the knowing that was traditionally 
placed in the head of the learner can now be found in the interaction’ (Barab & Plucker, 
2002, p. 169).
The argument in this paper has sought to highlight the reductive logic of both the 
psychometric approach to academic ability and related constructs, in terms of biological 
reductionism, and how this is also implicated in structural/constructivist approaches that 
can defer to this logic, whilst also disavowing it. Three areas of critique have been 
demarcated: how research on educational stratification can adopt a contradictory stance 
with respect to conceptualising academic ability as socially constructed, whilst also 
deferring to data based on innate measures that are reductive and limiting in practice; 
how cultural reproduction theory is itself a powerful social construction which evinces 
a determinism that can reinforce a fixed understanding of ability through over- 
investment in the concept of cultural capital, with ramifications on equal learning 
opportunities for all; how a narrow focus on educational stratification reifies instrumen-
tal outcomes and thereby devalues the broader purposes of education mitigating holistic 
theorising and methodological pluralism. Both the psychological and sociological 
approaches outlined earlier, in their reductive logic and outcomes, fail to engage with 
progressive conceptualisations of academic ability based on person-in-situation ‘as the 
minimal meaningful ontology for describing talent, ability, or even knowing’ (Barab & 
Plucker, 2002, p. 174). This has resulted in a situation in which schools lack a clear, 
holistic conceptualisation of academic ability beyond a measure of constructs such as 
cognitive ability that would arguably better serve all their pupils and facilitate a more 
useful and humane attention to quality and purpose in education in a far wider sense. 
Progressive models of academic ability drawing on more holistic theorising and meth-
odological pluralism will also serve to enhance the explanatory power of the concept of 
academic ability.
The implication for education policy and school-based practice, therefore, lies in the 
fact that reductive and deterministic conceptualisations of academic ability retain more 
authority than might be thought to be the case. If this is so, it is not the direction of travel 
in which we would want to go, given what the research referred to earlier suggests is 
progressive relative to educational practices in the future. A key recommendation would 
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then be that academic ability is treated more problematically and in need of greater focus 
at a meta-level, taking account of ontological and epistemic concerns in a more rigorous 
manner. Non-reductive theorising and methodological pluralism are more likely to move 
us towards more progressive practices in relation to academic ability than are dominant 
approaches at present.
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